

Title:

“The Border Conflict and The Geo Strategic Crisis: A Critical Assessment of Sino Indian Border War of 1962 and Its Implication in Indian Subcontinent”

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Abstract

The Border conflict of 1962 between India and China has been marked as one of the important events in the history of post Independent India. This was a significant war not only in Indian Subcontinent but in Asian Politics also where Key Geo-Strategic perspectives were placed into considerations under the more extensive thought of cold war issues. The fighting Nations had gone through the oppression of Colonialism earlier. The independence of these two Asian Giants raised hope over the then global politics of increasing hostility between USA and USSR. First Indian Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru envisioned that both the Nations would cooperate to expand harmony and congruity in Asia as well as to the entire world. Both the Nations signed an agreement in April, 1954 emphasizing the Five Principles (Panchasheel) of Peaceful Coexistence. After this agreement it was considered that these two Nations would deter the entry of Cold War Politics in the Subcontinent. Be that as it may, this understanding had some genuine disadvantages as both the Nations had

comprehended this understanding from their own national intrigue and hence neglected to build up the honorable provisos inalienable in it. Both sides accused each other for intruding respective territories. This led to a massive mistrust between these Nations. The escape of Dalai Lama from Chinese confinement and subsequent asylum in India territory further deteriorated the bilateral relations. The developing question concerning the outskirts issue was finished by the war of 1962 which demonstrated to be appalling and mortifying in the History of India after Independence.

Key Words

Border War, Military, Diplomacy, NAM, PLA, Cold War, Intrusion, Panchasheel, Peace, Geo-strategic, McMahon Line, Forward Policy, Cold War, Bilateral Relations, Indian Subcontinent

Abbreviations:

1. UNO – United Nations Organization
2. PRC – People’s Republic of China
3. PLA – People’s Liberation Army
4. NEFA – North-East Frontier Agency
5. MEA – Ministry of External Affairs
6. CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
7. USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
8. USA – United States of America
9. NAM – Non-Aligned Movement¹ (India announced to formulate an Independent Foreign Policy after Independence. India took a neutral stand against the power politics led by USA And USSR)

¹ Mentioned in Adams, Barbara., *Nepal: Crisis Unlimited – Reflections from the Crucial Years*. Adroit Publishers, pp. 65-58

10. CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force

Introduction

India and China possess great ancient values which continue to enshrine the world's Civilization over the years. Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism are still regarded for their enriched way of thinking. Both the Nations had close cultural affinity over the years. Trade and commerce continued to flourish from time to time and era to era. From the Historical records, it is known that the Chinese Scholars like Fa Hein, Huen Tsang visited India and the social ties proceeded as Atish Dipankar and other Indian Buddhist researchers lectured Buddhism in Tibet. The Astronomical work of Aryabhata was converted into Chinese scientific book. Harsh Bardhan and The Chola rulers had great exchange relations with the Chinese Dynasties. In the medieval period, the connection between the two nations was tranquil and exchange kept on being an overwhelming component. In nineteenth-century, the Chinese disdain against ceaseless opium exchange laid her towards war with the British. Be that as it may, later The Republic of China and British India went to a trade-off to battle together to counteract Japanese hostility in Asia during the Second World War. After the finish of the Second World War, India got Independent on fifteenth Aug 1947 and the Republic of China rose as Peoples Republic of China in 1949 making a finish of a long Civil War. India had witnessed a prolonged struggle for Independence against the British Imperialism. Over 200 years India faced colonial rule and domination. The indomitable Indians compelled the British to leave India and follow the Process of Decolonization.²

After the Independence in 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Indian Prime Minister, attempted to advocate the vision of 'resurgent Asia' where he longed for a serene

² Pls. follow Arpi, Claude., *Tibet: The Lost Frontier*. Lancer Publishers, pp. 232-238

Indian Subcontinent which would represent humankind and will oppose a wide range of dominion, hostility, and abuse. Truth be told, India was the primary nation, aside from the Socialist Block, which recognized China first and upheld Chinese inclusion in the UNO. China's Premier Chou Enlai respected India's initiative in universal clashes like the Korean War of 1950. India gradually upheld the great democratic aspirations to solve the then world crises. India represented herself as the champion of humanity. China, on the other hand, was not considered as a reliable partner in world politics for her deep socialist attachment. To comprehend the Sino-Indian competition, one must concentrate on the ideological contrasts that assumed a crucial job between the top authorities of the concerned nations. The Indian National Congress had fought for Indian Independence through the means of non-violence. There was a self-contradiction within the Indian state machinery as to what extent India should go to protect her sovereignty and integrity keeping a balance between non-violence and real power politics. Conversely, Mao caught Chinese control following an aggressive model. So China had little restraint in contrast with India in regards to the execution of state policies and state apparatus. In 1954, both the Nations had signed the Panchasheel agreement to ascertain peaceful co-existence. Nehru termed this as deterrence to 'armed co-existence'. After signing the treaty, mistrust was in high pitch between the Nations. Both accused each other of violating the border area and intrusion thereafter. Under this growing tension, china built Xinxiang Tibet road and made the Indian border security more vulnerable. The escape of Dalai Lama and his refuge in Indian soil caused high resentment to the Chinese leadership. The contradictory claims of the Boundary line further aggravated the tension. The Chinese were no longer ready to acknowledge the Mc Mahon Line as a boundary between India and China. India was no longer ready to compromise with Chinese claims. Nehru announced to set up Forward Policy across the disputed border to protect the Indian Territory. New Indian

Military posts were established across the borders in Northern and North Eastern Sectors. The skirmishes began in the middle of 1962. China on 20th October 1962 attacked India. Indian military preparations proved vulnerable in front of Chinese aggression.

Research Methodology

In this study, I have gone through both the Primary and Secondary Source materials. The Primary sources dealing with this particular topic are available in the National Archives of India, Indian Council of World Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs website, History Division, Ministry of Defence; Govt. of India, Central Secretariat Library and Institute of Chinese and studies. The reports and records of the particular Departments helped me a lot to find out the exact scenario of the conflict. All the departments also provided me a handful collection of secondary source materials. The book written by Anna Appadorai titled The Bandung Conference. Published by the Indian Council of World Affairs gave me an insight of Indian Foreign Policy adopted by Pandit Nehru at that time. Claude, Arpi has written a book titled 'The Lost Frontier helped me to understand the Tibetan Crisis in the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962. P.C. Chakravarti's book 'India-China Relations' highlighted the details of the two civilizations named India and China. His book proved to a masterpiece for my research work. J.N.Chowdhury's composition of 'The Tribal Culture and History of Arunachal Pradesh' gave me a detailed analysis of the ethnic problem of the region. Goutam Das's book 'Understanding the Sino-Indian War 1962' perfectly analyzed the crisis covering the local and international aspects of the crisis. The book written by S.B. Dutta-Tripathy titled sources of the History of Arunachal Pradesh, helped me to understand the detailed history of the land and how it had a relation with the Chinese occupied Tibet Nicholas Eftimaides's book, "Chinese Intelligence operations" thrust a light on the detailed planning of Chinese Liberation Army and the core aspects of China's intelligence gathering. Last but

not the least, Sudarshan Bhutani's book, "A Clash of Political Cultures: Sino Indian Relations (1957-1962), proved to be a masterpiece in showing the Sino-Indian Border conflict from a political and cultural angle. He did not place much attention on the scenarios of International Politics. His work helped a lot to understand the tensions which were very much prevalent between the Nations to dominate Asian Politics. All the primary and secondary source materials helped me –

- To find out the context of the Sino-Indian border conflict.
- To find out the aspects of cold war politics.
- To study Indian Foreign Policy.
- To study the cultural aspirations and ethnic problems of Tibet.
- To analyze the defense preparation of India and China prior to the conflict.
- To examine the details of the event and its implication on India in particular.
- To study the 'Balance of Power Politics' in the region.

In January 1950, China announced to establish her Sovereign rights over Tibet. Earlier, Tibet was a matter of concern for China for a long time. In 7th Century Tibetan empire came into existence but did not able to persist longer. For a long time, Tibet was under the control of Mongols and then Chinese rulers occupied it. Tibet virtually became a suzerain place for the Mongols and Chinese. Tibet's status changed after the Xinhai Revolution in 1912 against the Chinese Qing Dynasty.³

Tibet declared Independence and continued to retain its Sovereign Status till 1950. In 1950, the PRC declared that China must guarantee the command over Tibet. Following this declaration, the PLA entered Tibet in August 1950 and involved Tibet. From the British time frame, India Treated Tibet as a self-sufficient cradle zone which would

³ As discussed in Avedon, John F., *In Exile from the Land of Snows*. Wisdom Publications, pp. 458

ensure India's North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) from remote animosity. British India needed a Tibet which would not be constrained by the terrain China. The British recognized the Chinese Suzerainty over Tibet not Chinese Sovereignty. Afterward, PRC denied the Shimla Convention marked in 1914 between Tibetan Rulers and British authority indicating the explanation that China didn't think ever that Tibet as a free state could consent to a bargain or arrangement or show with another Foreign State.⁴

In spite of the fact that the PRC, at the beginning, didn't express any dissent with respect to McMahon line marked among Tibet and British India. In March 1947, Tibet participated to the Asian Relations Conference disregarding the disdain of Kuomintang China. The Interim Govt. of India led by Pandit Nehru guaranteed the representatives that Anglo-Tibetan arrangements must be ensured by all means. An Indian Army Officer was presented on Lhasa as counsel to the Tibetan Government. At the point when PLA invaded Tibet, India gave three dissent notes to the Peoples Republic of China. China's answer was sharp and critical to the notes given by the Indian Govt. China announced that she would not offer significance to other nation's anxiety with respect to the sway and Integrity of her land. China was not happy at the Indian stand towards Tibet. Chinese conception was that India was trying to interfere with the Tibetan issue unnecessarily.⁵

China also accused India of following the imperial legacy towards Tibet and China. In May 1951, Nehru completely changed India's position regarding China. Prime Minister Nehru and K.M. Panikkar, the then Indian Ambassador to China, Came to the decision that India must try to befriend China rather fruitlessly confronting her militarily. India expected that China would acknowledge the Indian friendship in a reciprocal manner.

⁴ Excerpted from Bakshi, K.N., *I was a Prisoner of War in China*. Lancer Publishers, pp. 398

⁵ Pls. follow, Das, Gautam. *Understanding the Sino-Indian War 1962*. Har-Anand Publications, pp. 176-178

However, India's First Home Minister Sardar Vallabhai Patel however warned Nehru about the intention of the Peoples Republic of China and asked to be cautious regarding the border issue with China. But, Nehru was in the firm belief that by befriending China, India would fulfill the greater Asian cause for peace and solidarity and minimize the Chinese threat also. Hence, in 1959, 29th April – China and India had signed a bilateral agreement. It was originally named as 'Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibetan Trade and Intercourse'.⁶ Upon the insistence of Nehru, 'Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence' was incorporated in the Preamble of the agreement and thus it came to be known as Panchasheel agreement where mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference, mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence were mentioned categorically. It was considered that this treaty would enhance the peace and solidarity in the region and would solve all the existing mistrust by mutual dialogue. However, Historians are of the opinion regarding the Chinese intentions behind signing this agreement. China was fearful about the compromise made between Chiang Kai Sheik and the Western Power Block to oust the Communist Govt. from China. China wanted to strengthen the solidarity with her neighbors in case the Western Block attacked it.⁷

From the beginning, this agreement proved imbalanced. China assured her dominance over Tibet but India gained nothing.

1. China did not officially recognize the McMahon line as a border between NEFA and Tibet.
2. China got access to establish new trade agencies in New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong whereas India found no new trade region with Chinese Tibet.

⁶ As mentioned in Chakravarti, Sudeep., *Red Sun: Travels in Naxalite Country*. Penguin, pp. 57

⁷ An Excerpt from Sawhney, Pravin & Wahb Ghazala. *Dragon on our Doorstep: Managing China through Military Power*, Aleph Book Company, pp.256-262

3. Regarding the Indian Pilgrims, China followed a dubious policy.

4. India withdrew the military escorts and posts and telegraph lines that were in Tibet from British Period and hence lost all her strategic dividends over Tibet.

Immediate after signing the Panchasheel agreement, the incidents of border intrusions began to take place. Both nations were different in opinion regarding the border area in Aksai Chin and NEFA. Under the suspicion Nehru paid a visit in China on October 1954. Nehru was overwhelmed to discover an official Chinese map claiming 50,000/- sq. miles of Indian Territory.⁸

Before Nehru's visit, China already laid claim over Barhoti, an area situated in the middle sector of the Indo-China border. Nehru was annoyed and asked the MEA to publish a map that would show the Mc Mohan line as the firm and the clear border between the two neighboring countries. India also showed Aksai Chin as her own area and henceforth recognized the Jhonson line in the northern sector. On the coming visit of Chou Enlai, Nehru addressed his concern over the Chinese publication of Maps and the claim of NEFA. Chou paid no attention to India's concern. It was evident from the Chinese Premier's stand that China would not compromise with her intentions. Chou categorically told Nehru that China would not think to change her borderline with India. Later, Nehru expressed his regret as he blindly believed Chou without having an official recognition from China.⁹

The Chinese strategy was – not to meddle with McMahan line at that point of time. In 1957 China announced the completion of Sinkiang Tibet road through Aksai Chin. This incident rattled India a lot. India did not get any clue nor had any intelligence inputs regarding this road. By then, gradually China began to pose her real intention by claiming

⁸ As discussed in, Chakravarti, P.C., *India-China Relations*. Firma K.L.Mukhopadhyay, pp. 85-88

⁹ Follow, Verma, Shivkumar., 1962, *The War That Was Not*. Aleph Book Company, pp. 72-78. pp. 72-78.

NEFA, some areas of Uttar Pradesh and large areas of Ladakh including Aksai Chin. India sent a protest note to China on 21st August 1958. China ignored it and refuted India for unilaterally fixing the Boundary. The Khampa tribes of Tibet rebelled against the Chinese domination over Tibet. They protested against the destruction of cultural heritage and tradition of Tibet. Meanwhile, the high degree of oppression of the Chinese army in Lhasa caused resentment among the Tibetans. The Khampa tribes of Tibet began a rebellion and which turned in mass rebellion. China sent thousands of Forces to suppressing it. The Tibetan religious leader was kept in house arrest. The situation took a dramatic forth when Dalai Lama escaped from Tibet and took shelter in India. China directly accused India of meddling with the Chinese internal matters along with the CIA. By this time, China and USSR were in a rival position regarding the leadership of the International Communist Movement. There was a border problem with USSR too. China did not look upon the Indo-Soviet friendship in a friendly manner. Mao's China did not welcome India's Policy of NAM and taking the leadership of the Third World Countries. China tagged India as a Bourgeoisie and inheritor of the Imperial system. The first major incident of border clash began in Longju area of NEFA in August where both the armies tried to push back each other without firing. The incidents of border clash began to happen in a serial manner.¹⁰

On 21st October, Indian CRPF Patrol Team to Kongka Pass in nearby Aksai Chin area faced Chinese firing where 10 Indian Soliders were martyred. India's Public opinion was grave and against the Mao's China. India sent strong protest notes. Chou Enlai accused India for provoking the Chinese Soldiers and proposed a status quo within 20 kilometers of the Northern and Eastern Sector of the border. Nehru, on 27th November, 1959 in Indian Parliament accused China for following the expansionist design of South Asia and

¹⁰ As mentioned by Lamb, Alistair, *The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries*. Oxford University Press, pp. 273-289

of ignoring India's growing concern over border issue. India's Public Opinion was against any kind of negotiations with the Chinese Govt. Chou Enlai was eager to come to Delhi and have a discussion with Nehru. He came to Delhi in April 1960. Both the countries differed on the demarcation process. India stressed upon watershed principle whereas China was not agreed upon. After the failure of the negotiation process, the opposition parties in India began to Pressurize Nehru to oust China from Aksai Chin and liberated the motherland from foreign aggression. Under these circumstances, Nehru designed the 'Forward Policy'.¹¹ On 7th May 1961, India formally recognized the forward policy to withstand the growing intrusions of the Chinese army throughout the border. India announced that she would build military posts across the border to check the Chinese army. China reacted sharply, accusing India of provoking China and asked to refrain from the Policy. China, in April 1962, informed India that she would again send the patrolling teams across the border to check the Indian illegitimate intrusions along the border. Thus, the stage was ready for the final confrontation. From July 1962 situation turned to be worse. Border clashes in the areas like Galwan Valley, Chip Chap Valley, Demchok area began to be reported. On 8th September, one thousand Chinese Soldiers crossed the Mc Mohan line and challenged the Indian Patrol team in Dhola ridge by opening fire. The Indian Soldiers gave a befitting reply which caused several casualties to both Nations. The situation was grave and serious in nature.

The Eastern Command and Western Command were alerted accordingly. Instructions came from headquarter of the army to face the battle with China and defend the Chinese aggression.¹² On 20th October 1962, The Chinese launched a preemptive heavy

¹¹ Mentioned in Hoffman, Steven. A., *Rethinking the Linkage between Tibet and the China-India Border Conflict*. University of California Press, pp. 182-83;

¹² See also, Raghavan, Srinath., *War and Peace in Modern India*, Palgrave Macmilan, pp. 306

firing across the border in the Eastern and Western sectors. The Indian posts in Dhola ridge fell by notwithstanding against Chinese army. The Chinese defense ministry accused India of beginning a provocative war. On 21st October, Demchok fell into the Chinese line. On 22nd October, Kibitoo situated in the extreme end of NEFA fell down within few days, the war proved to be one-sided as China began the war treacherously by taking advantage of the Indian Army which was totally unprepared and underprepared in comparison to the enemy.¹³ China took advantage of the comfortable geographical location and good communication and transport line. India lacked in every sphere. Indian Intelligence totally failed to gather accurate information from the ground. In the meantime, on 24th October, China aired a cease-fire and asked India to be ready for discussion. The Chinese proposal was humiliating to India, as it denied the Panchasheel agreement and dignity of the Indian Nation.

India sought help from America directly. J.F. Kenedy restored in a positive and effective tone. Britain Showed sympathy to India and the Joint delegate from Britain and America visited India to extend the necessary help. The USSR was involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis and did not want to involve in the Sino-Indian Border clash which gave a dividend to China indirectly.¹⁴ On 16th Nov. 1962, India began to retaliate. The clash was very intense in NEFA where India lost all the supply lines as China Captured all the important passes quite earlier. Bomdi La, Se La fell into the Chinese line. Thousands of Soldiers were captured and many more faced death. NEFA fell into the Chinese hand in spite of having an inch to inch fight. In the Northern sector, the Indian army retaliated sharply.

¹³ As mentioned by Neville Maxwell, *An Introduction to the Henderson-Brooks Report*, *Economic & Political Weekly*, pp. 119-121

¹⁴ An excerpt from Guruswamy, Mohan and Daulet Singh, Zorawar., *India China Relations: Border Issues and Beyond*. Viva Books, pp. 84-86

Major Shaitan Sing saved the Chusul area. In this sector, China did nothing and faced heavy casualties also.¹⁵

By this time the Chinese were tired and feared of assuming long drawn warfare against India. The help of the Western Countries started to arrive in India. India was preparing for an all-out War to Oust the Peoples Liberation Army from the occupied Territories. On 21st Nov, China, all on a sudden, unilaterally announced a ceasefire and went behind the 20kms of McMahon line and Line of Actual Control in Northern Sector but occupied Aksai Chin mentioning it an important strategic area for Tibet. India replied very cautiously. India did not acknowledge the unilateral ceasefire but instructed the army not to move further and keep restraint in an utmost manner.

Conclusion

Now, the question is how did this border conflict affect the prospects of future India? How did the International community perceive India after the war? Was Pakistan trying to take undue advantages calculating the vulnerable condition of India? How did this war change the Geo-strategic perspectives in the Subcontinent? The outcome of the Sino-Indian border confrontation was undoubtedly disastrous in Indian History. India was not ready to face such a humiliation. Nehru called China, a betrayer who took undue advantage of Indian goodwill and trust. However, the outcome of the border war raised serious questions regarding Indian Sovereignty. It raised serious questions over the farsightedness of political leadership and infrastructural weakness of the military of the country. It raised questions over the justification of the following non-aligned movement (NAM). It raised questions over the

¹⁵ See pls, Deepak Ollapally.. *The Evolution of India's Relations with Russia: Tried, Test, and Searching for Balance*, in Ganguly (ed.), *India's Foreign Policy*, pp. 226-50; and David Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, pp. 234-42

balance of power in South Asia. The strategic advantage India delivered to China by recognizing the Panchasheel agreement without securing her security compulsions was put under the lens of geo-strategic reconsiderations. The debacle India faced by the defeat decreased India's image in the Global stature. India proved to be vulnerable. This war showed the lack of good synergy between political leadership and military establishment. At the crisis point, India sought help from the U.S.A. and Britain. Assurances came from these countries immediately. But, this put a serious question mark on India's ideological Foreign Policy of NAM (Non-Aligned Movement). The Third World Countries had perceived doubts upon Nehru's Foreign Policy. The Countries began to question whether NAM was sufficient to protect sovereignty. Nehru, after the debacle, had no other alternative than strengthening the Indian military apparatus. India's non-violence ideology had to be halted owing to regional imbalances in Power Politics. Nehru, from time to time, signed the Arms procurement Agreement with both USSR and U.S.A. The Cold War Politics, thus, engulfed the Indian Sub-continent. USA and U.K. compelled India to negotiate with Pakistan regarding the Kashmir issue. India had no choice than beginning bilateral talks with Pakistan. Pakistan and China signed an agreement to extend mutual support to enhance the peace and stability of the region. This also put a mounting pressure upon India. In the regional Balance of power, India was cornered after the ceasefire in 1962; a conference was convened in Colombo to mediate between the two Nations. This conference did not bring any permanent solution but encouraged the peace and stability of the conflict zone. Nehru in his life wanted to solve the border problem so that this problem did not come upon India 'hereditary'. But his sudden death in 1964 spoiled his last desire of solving the disputed border issue with China. The successive Indian governments tried to solve the issue through bilateral discussions. In

spite of that discussions, 'Aksai Chin' is still under the 'occupation' of China and Indian state Arunachal Pradesh is being called as the extended part of South Tibet by China.

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▪ **ANNEXTURE-A**

Colombo proposal together with clarifications (in italics) offered to the Government of India on behalf of the Colombo Conference by representative of Ceylon, United Arab Republic and Ghana during talks in Delhi between January 11 and 13, 1963:

‘1. The Conference considers that the existing *de facto* case fire period is a good starting point for a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chinese conflict.

‘2. (a) With regard to the WESTERN SECTOR, the Conference would like to make an appeal to the Chinese Government to carry out their 20 kilometers withdrawal of their

military posts as has been proposed in the letter of Prime Minister Chou En-lai to Prime Minister Nehru on November 21 and November 28, 1962.

(b) The Conference would make an appeal to the Indian Government to keep their existing military position.

(c) Pending a final solution of the border dispute, the area vacated by the Chinese military withdrawals will be demilitarized zone to be administered by civilian posts of both side to be agreed upon, without prejudice to the rights of the previous presence of both Indian and China in the area.

CLARIFICATION

- (i) The withdrawal of Chinese forces proposed by the Colombo Conference will be 20 kilometers as proposed by Prime Minister Chou En-lai to Prime Minister Nehru in the statement of the Chinese Government dated 21st November and in Prime Minister Chow En-lai's letter of 28th November, 1962, i.e. from the line of actual control between the two sides as of November 7, 1959, as defined in maps III and V circulated by the Government of China.
- (ii) The existing military posts which the forces of the Government of India will keep to will be on and up to the line indicated in (i) above.
- (iii) The demilitarized zone of 20 kilometers created by Chinese military withdrawals will be administered by civilian posts of both sides. This is a substantive part of the Colombo Conference proposals. It is as to the location, the number of posts and their composition that there has to be an agreement between the two Governments of India and China.

3. With regard to the EASTERN SECTOR, the conference considers that the line of actual control in the areas recognized by both the Governments could serve as a cease fire line to their respective positions. Remaining areas in this sector can be settled in their future discussion.

CLARIFICATION

The Indian forces can, in accordance with the Colombo Conference proposals, move right up to the south of the line of actual control, i.e., the Mc. Mahon line, except for the two areas on which there is difference of opinion between the Governments of India and China. The Chinese forces similarly can move right up to the north of the McMahan Line except for these two areas. The two areas referred to as the remaining areas in the Colombo Conference proposals, arrangements in regard to which are to be settled between the Governments of India and China according to the Colombo Conference proposals, are Che Dong or the Thagla ridge area and the Longju area, in which cases there is a difference of opinion as to the line of actual control between the two Governments.

1. With regard to the problems of the MIDDLE SECTOR, the conference suggests that they will be solved by peaceful means, without resorting to force.

CLARIFICATION

The Colombo Conference desired that the status quo in this sector should be maintained and neither side should do anything to disturb the status quo.

5. The Conference believes that these proposals, which could help in consolidating the cease fire, once implemented, should pave the way for discussions between representatives of both parties for the purpose of solving problems entailed in the case fire position.

6. This Conference would like to make it clear that a positive response for the proposed appeal will not prejudice the position of either of the two Governments as regards its conception of the final alignment of the boundaries.’

Source: Dorothy Woodman, Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British Chinese, Indian and Russian Rivalries, The Cresset Press: London, P.403.